Chainflip’s next major release, v1.10, marks a meaningful step toward validator reforms and the longer-term FLIP 2.0 vision. 

With protocol revenue growing and product-market fit becoming more established, we’re turning our attention to refining the validator set, both to harden the network’s security and to align incentives more tightly around performance and capital commitment.

Let’s break down what’s changing, and why it matters.

Why These Validator Reforms Matter

As the protocol matures, so too must the economics that secure it. The current system allows for validators to bid into the active set with low FLIP commitments. In some cases, this means one underbid validator can drastically reduce the amount of FLIP locked across the entire network.

This isn’t sustainable, especially as Chainflip continues to scale and grow its role in powering high-volume swaps across BTC, ETH, SOL, and beyond. We’re moving toward a model where validators must commit meaningfully to be included.

The goal?

More FLIP locked. Stronger security. Easier access to yield opportunities for stakers.

Key Validator Changes in Release 1.10

Here’s what validator changes are coming in v1.10 that sets the groundwork for this shift:

Minimum MAB (Minimum Auction Bid) Setting

Validators will now be required to meet a minimum bid threshold to participate in the active set.

Today, if 149 validators bid 1M FLIP and just one bids 1 FLIP, the entire validator set only locks up 150 FLIP. With a minimum MAB of 50k FLIP, we prevent that scenario and ensure that economic security scales with the network.

This is the first step toward delegated staking, where a baseline level of FLIP commitment becomes the foundation for securing rewards and participation.

What happens if Not Enough Validators Meet the Minimum?

If the minimum MAB is set too high, it’s possible the validator set shrinks, intentionally. This is by design.

The tradeoff is clear: fewer validators with higher skin in the game is better than many validators with little to no commitment.

The system can scale back up as new participants meet the threshold. This mechanism encourages healthy competition while reinforcing security through meaningful FLIP lockups.

Removal of Backup Node Rewards

Backup validators currently receive rewards without contributing to the protocol’s operation or performance.

We are cutting that out.

By removing them, we stop paying FLIP to passive actors and ensure rewards go only to those actively securing and participating in the network.

This improves reward efficiency and aligns incentives toward performance and uptime. This will immediately drop the network emissions by up to 20%.

Internal FLIP Transfers on the State Chain

This allows validators to move FLIP internally between Chainflip accounts.

This is a foundational building block for delegated staking, allowing delegation, staking, and reward handling to happen natively, without ERC20 roundtrips or gas-heavy operations.

It also unlocks more flexibility for validators and simplifies operational flows.

Looking Ahead: FLIP 2.0

These changes represent just the beginning of FLIP 2.0, a model that rewards long-term commitment and re-centers the value of the FLIP token in securing the Chainflip network. By increasing lockups, reducing waste, and improving capital efficiency, we’re laying the foundation for a more secure and sustainable validator economy.

Delegated staking is under heavy development right now, and will likely be launched in the following weeks.

We will also be opening up a more specific discussion around the FLIP 2.0 reforms as we complete the bulk of the staking reform work at the validator level.

We aim to complete the first wave of all FLIP 2.0 reforms within the next 2-3 months.

Stay tuned. More is coming.